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Abstract 
We  conduct  an  extensive  meta-regression  analysis  of  counterfactual  programme
evaluations from Italy, considering both published and grey literature on enterprise and
innovation policies. We specify a multilevel model for the probability of finding positive
effect estimates,  also assessing correlation possibly induced by co-authorship networks.
We find that the probability of positive effects is considerable, especially for weaker firms
and outcomes that are directly targeted by public programmes. However, these policies are
less likely to trigger change in the long run.
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1. Introduction
In recent times, awareness has increased about the importance of policies addressing evolutionary
or  systemic  failures  and grand societal  challenges  (Malerba,  2009;  Edquist,  2011;  Mazzuccato,
2013, 2018). These policies  pay particular  attention to the innovation system, within which the
various skills that are necessary to trigger technological change, learning and innovation can be
combined. The system dimension is also necessary to formulate strategies towards societal grand
challenges, which require the combination of various types of public and private investments, skills
and other resources (Mazzuccato, 2018). 
This  notwithstanding,  the  bulk  of  industrial  and  innovation  policies  still  consists  of  the
widespread support of individual  firms, with their  investment  projects  being neither particularly
rooted on a systemic logic,  nor focused on grand challenges.  Obviously, also the latter  type of
policies has its own  raison d'être,  rooted in the ideas of market and managerial  failures, which
might prevent firms, especially SMEs, from investing in innovation (e.g., Metcalfe, 1995; Peneder,
2008). However, their effectiveness is the subject of constant debate in several corners of the world
(Rodrik, 2008; Cimoli et al., 2009; Pianta et al., 2020).
Fortunately, the culture and practice of counterfactual programme evaluation has been on the
rise  in  recent  years,  which makes it  more and more possible  to  formulate  judgments  based on
evidence, rather than ideology. The main results of these assessments can be summarised using a
meta-regression analysis  (MRA),  which is  “the  systematic  review and quantitative  synthesis  of
empirical economic evidence on a given hypothesis, phenomenon, or effect” (Stanley et al., 2013, p.
391). The potential usefulness of this approach is particularly marked in the area of programme
evaluation, where causal programme effects often suffer from limited external validity (Olsen et al.,
2013; Alcott, 2015; Athey and Imbens, 2017). MRA can help generalise beyond “local” inferences
(Bandiera  et  al.,  2016;  Vivalt,  2020)  and understand  to  which  extent,  and in  which  situations,
enterprise and innovation policies are effective according to the estimates reported in counterfactual
evaluations. 
Despite the importance and diffusion of enterprise and innovation policies, few MRAs exist in
the literature which focus on specific policy tools, such as R&D subsidies, R&D tax-credits or both
(Garcia-Quevedo,  2004;  Castellacci  and  Mee  Lie,  2015;  Dimos  and  Pugh,  2016).  Our  paper
contributes to this literature in multiple, original ways. 
First, we do not look only at R&D subsidies and R&D tax-credits. We broaden the scope of our
MRA to cover counterfactual estimates related to wider range of public supports to the investment
process of private firms: subsidies, tax-credits and direct loans for R&D, as well as subsidies, direct
loans and public loan guarantee schemes in favour of more generic investments. Moreover, unlike
previous studies, we strongly focus on features such as the type of beneficiaries of the policies (e.g.
large vs small firms), the level of government at which the incentives are granted, or the time at
which an effect is likely to be found.
Second, to tackle issues of publication bias, we perform a systematic search of the available
evidence and we collect both published and grey (i.e. unpublished) literature. Indeed, the validity of
the conclusions reached by a MRA can be challenged by the preference of journal editors to publish
studies that report conclusive results, which might imply that studies with significant estimates are
over-represented in the published literature. This issue can be addressed by including in the MRA as
many studies as possible that appeared outside of journals (Hopewell et al., 2007; Card et al., 2010).
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In fact, statistically rigorous evaluation analyses can be found also in policy reports that are not
intended for publication in international scientific journals, but which, nonetheless, contain valuable
information. It is evident that the systematic research of grey literature requires to delimit the field.
We choose to focus on a single country, Italy, in order to guarantee that the studies considered all
refer  to  a  relatively  homogenous  institutional  and  business  environment.  Despite  the  strong
diffusion of evaluation culture and practice, Italy has been vastly disregarded by the existing meta-
analyses. For example, our search reveals that from 2000 to 2016 the Italian counterfactual program
evaluation literature on firms’ investments support consists of no less than 50 studies, including
1,066 treatment effect estimates, 564 of which are related to R&D and 502 to other investment
support programmes.1 
Third,  to  fully  acknowledge  the  hierarchical  structure  of  the  data,  we  build  on  the  meta-
regression approach by Card et al. (2010, 2017) and specify a multilevel meta-regression model for
the probability of having a positive effect that is also statistically significant. Indeed, our data are
laid in a hierarchical structure, with treatment effect estimates at the lower level and studies at the
upper  level.  Estimates  may  depend  not  only  on  the  characteristics  of  the  programme  under
investigation and its beneficiaries, but also on the choices made by the authors in carrying out their
studies. Both aspects may be partially unobservable, especially when related to intrinsic programme
quality  or  to  particular  analytical  choices  that  the  authors  choose  not  to  reveal.  Disentangling
possible observable sources of success, while accounting for the influence exerted by unobservable
factors, can be useful to understand how, and for whom, programmes may be improved, as well as
to ease learning by policymakers (Mytelka and Smith, 2002; McKelvey and Saemundsson, 2018).
To this end, the usage of hierarchical statistical models for MRA that include terms of unobserved
heterogeneity  seems particularly  appropriate.  Nonetheless,  this  class  of  models  has  found very
limited application in the area of economic MRA (Awaworyi Churchill et al., 2016; Ugur et al.,
2016; Ugur et al., 2017).
Fourth, we acknowledge that the programme evaluation literature that is meta-analysed may be
characterised – as in many other scientific fields – by a networked structure that sees some scholars
regularly  publish  on  the  topic,  while  others  contribute  more  episodically  to  the  field  literature
(Newmann, 2001). We believe that such structure, ignored by earlier MRA, deserve to be accounted
for. In particular,  when using multilevel models, it could pose a threat to the plausibility of the
standard assumption  of between-group independence,  in  that  two or  more articles  by the  same
author might share some unobserved “scholar effect”. We argue that this issue should be addressed,
at  least  during  robustness  analysis,  by  introducing  sensible  hypotheses  about  the  correlation
structure that might link study-level random components.
Finally, to assess the threat posed by p-hacking, or selective reporting – such that authors are
more likely to report the estimates that satisfy the minimal requirements of statistical significance –
we borrow manipulation tests from regression discontinuity designs (McCrary, 2008; Cattaneo et
al., 2017), which may suggest the existence of discontinuity in the density of estimates at the two
sides of conventional thresholds of statistical significance.
Section 2 presents how we have collected Italian counterfactual estimates into a single dataset,
while Section 3 is devoted to the presentation of our hierarchical meta-regression model. Section 4
1 Note that existing meta-analyses in this field, which have a global coverage, include almost this same number of
studies and estimates, with only one or two studies that are related to Italy.
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outlines how the assumption of independence between studies may be relaxed. Section 5 reports the
results of our hierarchical MRA and Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
To collect  a relevant  sample of counterfactual  evaluation studies on the effectiveness of public
incentives to the investment activities of Italian firms, we started with a literature search on Google,
Google  Scholar,  EconLit,  IDEAS,  Scopus  and  ISI  Web  of  Science,  by  using  the  keywords
“enterprise policy evaluation”, “R&D policy evaluation”, “innovation policy evaluation” (also in
Italian:  “valutazione politiche per le imprese”,  “valutazione politiche per la R&S”, “valutazione
politiche per l’innovazione”). Once this initial list was created, we selected only those studies that
were related to Italian enterprise or innovation policies, implemented both at national and regional
scale.2 Then, we carefully investigated the reference lists of the studies retrieved and searched for
papers  that  were  not  already  included  in  our  initial  selection.  To  complete  our  list,  we asked
information to colleagues affiliated to three major Italian associations of economists, which often
host sessions devoted to enterprise policy evaluation in their conferences.3 We completed our search
in December 2016.To facilitate  the comparability  of the studies,  we selected only those papers
adopting  the  methodological  tools  of  the  econometrics  of  programme  evaluation  (Imbens  and
Wooldridge, 2009) or other methodologies that are suitable to draw causal claims (e.g. structural
models,  marginal  structural  models,  etc.).  Since  these  methods  were  primarily  thought  for
estimating treatment effects in the presence of independent observations (e.g. under the Stable Unit
Treatment Value Assumption; Imbens and Rubin, 2015), they have been mostly used to evaluate the
incentives to individual enterprises, rather than those targeting consortia of firms or other types of
temporary associations. Therefore, we restrict attention to studies on individual firm incentives. 
As a  result  of  this  search  process,  we have  50  selected  studies,  which  were  published  (or
written) from 2000 to 2016 (see Web Supplementary Material). Only 18 of these studies are written
exclusively in Italian, while the rest is written in English (or in both languages). Studies are both
articles  published in refereed academic journals,  and book chapters or unpublished manuscripts
(e.g., working papers or policy reports). The choice of including studies appeared in outlets other
than scientific journals was made not only for the sake of completeness, but also to guard against
publication bias.4 Despite our best efforts to cover the whole relevant literature, we must consider
the possibility that some existing studies dedicated to the evaluation of programmes implemented in
the time period under analysis  have been involuntarily overlooked. It  is also possible that such
studies appear during the writing of this paper or will come out one day. Given this possibility, we
must look at the selected studies (and at the treatment effect estimates they report) as if they were a
2 Italy is characterised by a quasi-federal system in which a large part of enterprise and innovation policies are shared
between Regions and the State on the basis of the principle of vertical subsidiarity (Caloffi and Mariani, 2018). As a
result, regional-scale initiatives coexist with some programmes of national relevance that are managed by the Italian
government.
3 We interviewed our colleagues during the annual meetings (2016) of the SIE-Italian Economic Association, SIEPI-
Italian Society of Industrial Economics and Policy, AISRe-Italian Association of Regional Science.
4 During the preparation of this paper, some of the working papers initially selected ended up being published in a
journal. In such cases, we updated the records relative to the study in our dataset. No update occurred for papers that
appeared in journals during 2017.
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large  sample  from  a  super-population  of  Italian  studies  (of  estimates).Each  of  the  50  studies
includes  one  or  more  treatment  effect  estimates,  as  well  as  a  description  of  the  policy  under
analysis. To create the database for our meta-analysis, we carefully read the studies and agreed on
how to  codify  the  relevant  information.  In  particular,  we  adopted  the  following  protocol.  We
selected a subset of 10 articles, which we all read and discuss how to codify. Then, each co-author
codified another 10 articles and her or his work was reviewed by a different co-author. In the final
stage, each co-author reviewed the complete database.
Often, the studies reported treatment effect estimates on multiple outcome variables. We looked
at all estimates, obtained under the classical binary-treatment framework, which the authors chose
to include in the section(s) devoted to results, leaving aside only those presented in sections or
appendixes dedicated to robustness checks or sensitivity analysis.5 In some cases, the authors chose
to present in their results section more than one treatment effect estimate on the same outcome
variable, without stating any order of preference. For example, some papers adopting regression
discontinuity  designs  report  estimates  under  different  bandwidths  and/or  different  polynomial
approximations, while others that perform statistical matching may report estimates under different
numbers of matched controls. When this occurred, we selected the estimate that, based on statistical
theory, was less likely to be affected by bias (e.g., the one associated with the narrowest bandwidth
or the one associated with the lowest number of matched controls, e.g., Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009; Gelman and Imbens, 2019), whereas estimates on different outcomes were all kept in. The
result of our selection process is a hierarchical database including 1,066 estimates from 50 studies.
On average, each article reports 21.3 estimates (standard deviation = 31.1). Half of these estimates
(10.6 on average) refer to the overall  treatment  effect,  while  10.7 refer to treatment  effects  for
specific subgroups of firms. The estimates are often related to several outcome variables, which
may be expressed in  different  measurements  units.  As a whole,  we have found more than one
hundred different outcome variables. Those that are more frequently used are employment (about
8% of estimates), turnover (7%), investments, R&D expenditures or R&D employees, value added,
productivity, probability of survival and profitability. These outcomes are sometimes expressed in
levels, while other times they are ratios, variations or growth rates. As will be explained later in the
paper, this heterogeneity of measurement units call for some transformation of the treatment effect
estimates in order to make them comparable. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics related to the variables characterising the estimates and the
studies from which they are drawn. Such variables are primarily classified depending on how often
they take values that are constant at the study level. If a variable never changes at the study level but
only between studies, then it can be viewed as a variable describing the study. If it  also varies
within the study, then it is related to the estimate level.
3. Methodology
Our data have a two-level hierarchical structure.  Let  i denote the  i-th collected treatment effect
estimate (first level of the hierarchy, i= 1,… ,n) drawn from study j (second level, j=1 , … ,J). Let y ij
5 An extremely limited number of papers also reported estimates obtained in a continuous-treatment framework, for
example using generalised propensity scores and dose-response functions. These latter few estimates were left out of the
sample, as – for several reasons – they were hardly comparable to the others.
5
be the value of such estimate or some reasonable transformation of this value, and x ij the vector of
covariates related to such estimate.  As shown in Table 2, some of these variables never change
across  the  estimates  from  the  same  study,  whereas  others  do.  To  properly  account  for  the
hierarchical structure of the data, we resort to a multilevel meta-regression model; an approach that
is  still  underused  in  economic  meta-analysis  studies  in  spite  of  its  potential  (e.g.,  Awaworyi
Churchill et al., 2016; Ugur et al., 2016; Ugur et al., 2017). In very general terms, the response
variable  in  such  model  is  function  of  both  the  observed  explanatory  variables  and  a  term  of
unobserved heterogeneity at the study level,  u j. In brief, this approach entails that the variability
that  remains  unexplained  by  covariates  is  captured  by  two  different  error  components:  one
associated  with  the  unobserved  factors  that  all  estimates  grouped  in  a  given  study  j  have  in
common, and one related to the individual level. 
3.1 The outcome variable
As the collected estimates are expressed in many heterogeneous measurement units, we need to
transform  them  so  that  the  response  variable  of  our  meta-regression  model  has  one  single
measurement unit. To do so, we divide the raw value of each estimate by its associated standard
error, thus obtaining the t-statistic t ij. We recode the sign of the t ij in those cases where a negative
sign goes in the direction desired by the policy,  and vice versa. For example,  if public support
reduces the risk of firm exit, then the negative sign of the t-statistic must be turned positive; instead,
if it increases exit risk, then the positive sign of the t ij must be turned negative.6
The use of t ij as an outcome variable does not account for the fact that there is enough support
against the null hypothesis of null that the average treatment effect is equal to zero only for when t ij
is above a certain value. In other words, only t-statistics above a certain threshold denote positive
effects that are conventionally regarded as being statistically significant. This can be accounted for
by creating a discrete  response variable  for both the sign and the statistical  significance of the
treatment effect estimate. For example, in their meta-regression of causal studies on active labour
market policies, Card et al. (2010; 2017) create an ordinal response variable whose three values
denote, respectively, statistically significant negative effects, insignificant effects, and significant
positive effects. We will adopt this same approach but, given the negligible number of statistically
significant negative effects reported in the pool of studies under investigation (only 5.8%, see Table
2), it seems sensible here to construct a simpler binary response variable that takes the value of one
if the estimate is both positive and statistically significant,  and zero otherwise (see also Garcia-
Quevedo, 2004; Kluve, 2010). A meta-regression model with such a response variable is actually a
model for the probability of having a positive  t ij greater than the critical value guaranteeing the
desired level of statistical significance.
All  tests  reported  in  the  studies  under  investigation  are  two-tailed,  i.e.  they  test  the  null
hypothesis that the effect is zero vs. the alternative hypothesis that it differs from zero. Estimates
that, according to such two-tailed tests, are significant at a 10% level are usually viewed as worthy
6 Other options to transform the value of the estimates are partial correlation coefficients and elasticities (Stanley and
Doucouliagos, 2012). Such options do not seem suitable to our context of analysis, which is characterised by estimates
obtained under the classical binary-treatment framework and with a widespread use of semi-parametric methods that try
to avoid model dependence.
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of some interest. However, since we focus only in significant positive effects, we consider the right-
tailed  test  for  the null  hypothesis  that  the  effect  is  null  or  harmful  to  firms  vs. the  alternative
hypothesis that it is beneficial, and transform the original two-tailed tests accordingly.
Thus, the response variable of our meta-regression model is defined as follows: 
y ij={1 if t ij>1 .6450 otherwise
where 1.645 is the critical value for the right-tailed test being significant at 5%.
As shown in Table 2, 32.2% of estimates are positive and associated with p-values that do not
exceed 5%.
For sensitivity analysis purpose, we will also consider a second binary outcome variable for
results that are both positive and significant at a 2.5% level according to a right-tailed test (t ij>1 .96
). These represent 25.4% of all estimates. This allows us to guard against possible practices of  
p-hacking that might occur in the proximity of the 5% significance threshold (e.g., Brodeur et al.,
2016; Bruns, 2017). 
3.2 Assessing the threat posed by p-hacking
P-hacking denotes the authors’ choice to report only statistically significant estimates that confirm
the hypotheses  of  interest  and may translate  into  an inflation  of  just-rejected  tests  for  the null
hypothesis of no average effect, possibly due to unobservable, ad hoc statistical practices. To assess
the presence of p-hacking, in Figure 1 we show the Kernel  probability  density  function of the
t-statistics  in  the  region  0≤ t ij≤ 3,  which  includes  three  major  threshold  values  for  statistical
significance. A ditch appears just below the 1.645 threshold, followed by a hump, which might raise
the suspect of p-hacking around the 5% significance cutoff (10% with usual two-tailed tests).
Building on Gerber and Malhotra (2008), we investigate further the presence of p-hacking using
a “manipulation test” based on density discontinuity, which is borrowed from the methodological
literature on regression discontinuity designs. The idea behind such tests is that, in the absence of
any manipulation around the threshold, the density should be continuous at the threshold itself. In
particular,  we apply  the test  developed by Cattaneo et  al.  (2018) based  on a  local  polynomial
density estimator7, which builds on McCrary (2008). 
As shown in Table 1, a global test on all available estimates does not reject the null hypothesis
that there is no discontinuity in the densities at the two sides of the cutoff, though Figure 1 might
suggest the contrary.  After we focus on meaningful subgroups of estimates,  we find support in
favour of a discontinuity at 1.645 only for the subset of estimates that were published, whereas no
jumps are found at higher significance thresholds. The jump we find for published estimates does
not  constitute  a  proof  that  p-hacking  has  occurred.  However,  it  suggests  that  including  many
estimates that are not drawn from journals in our sample was the right call, and that a sensitivity
analysis using a significance threshold of 2.5% is appropriate8.
7 The left and right approximations of the density at the threshold are done independently from each other. Inference
relies on a local cubic (triangular) Kernel approximation, with bandwidths optimised separately at each side using a
local quadratic fit.
8 Since the observed power of a given t ij is a one-to-one function of its own p-value, pij (Hoenig and Heisey, 2001),
repeating  the  meta-analysis  with  a  smaller  significance  threshold  is  equivalent  to  see  what  happens  if  one  (as  in
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Figure 1. Probability density function of the t-statistics in the region 0≤ t ij≤ 3
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a Gaussian Kernel with bandwidth = 0.15
Table 1.  Manipulation  tests  based on density  discontinuity  at  selected  threshold values  of  the  
t-statistic
Estimates come from 5% significance 2.5% significance 1% significance
Threshold = 1.645 Threshold = 1.960 Threshold = 2.326
test statistic p-value test statistic p-value test statistic p-value
All studies 1.263 0.207 -0.723 0.470 0.092 0.927
Parametric approach 1.109 0.267 -1.384 0.166 0.448 0.654
Semi-parametric approach 1.057 0.291 0.515 0.607 -0.505 0.613
Published studies 2.229** 0.026 -0.452 0.651 -0.710 0.477
Studies appeared elsewhere 0.317 0.751 -0.892 0.372 0.797 0.426
* p<0.10;  ** p<0.05;  *** p<0.01
3.3 The meta-regression model
Our multilevel approach builds on Card et al. (2010; 2017) and places their approach in a multilevel
framework.  In  so doing,  our  work  differs  from the  multilevel  MRAs conducted  by Awaworyi
Churchill  et  al.  (2016),  Ugur et  al.  (2016) and Ugur et  al.  (2017),  who build on the  Stanley’s
approach to meta-regression (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012).
Ioannidis et al., 2017) is more demanding in terms of the statistical power that each significant estimate should exhibit
to deserve consideration. In our study, the positive treatment effect estimates that are significant at 5% have a median
observed  power  of  81.7%,  a minimum of  50.3% and a  maximum near  to  100%. By selecting from the  previous
estimates only those whose  pij<0 .025 we conduct the analysis on a subset of significant estimates that have more
power. Here, the median observed power is 87.3% and the minimum is 62.5%.
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We specify the following multilevel meta-regression model for the  logit of the probability of
having a significantly positive treatment effect estimate:
η ij= logit [Pr ( y ij=1|x ij , u j ) ]=β0+βx x ij +u j, [1]
where  x ij is  a  set  of  p explanatory  variables  of  interest,  βx is  the  vector  of  related  unknown
coefficients and u j is the study random coefficient. Let define D as a n× J  matrix with element d ij
taking  value  1  if  observation  i is  in  study  j and  0  otherwise,  and  let  assume vectors  η=[ηij ],
β=[ β0 ,βx ], u= [u j ] and matrix X = [ x ij' ], then model [1] in matrix notation is 
η=Xβ+Du. [2]
The set of covariates X should include, in addition to other estimate- and study-level variables,
a covariate that measures sample size (e.g., the square root of the number of observations) or the
estimates’ precision (e.g., the estimates’ standard error, which depends on the sample size), in order
to  evaluate  and control  for  the  publication  bias  that  might  be due  to  this  source  (Stanley  and
Doucouliagos, 2012).
The term of unobserved heterogeneity u j could be defined as a fixed parameter or as a random
term. Since we look at our studies as at a sample from a population of Italian evaluation studies and
wish  to  draw  conclusions  pertaining  to  this  population,  and  since  we  also  wish  to  estimate
coefficients associated to study-level explanatory variables, then it is appropriate to view the term u j
as a random coefficient (Snijders and Bosker, 2012, Chapter 4). 
We initially assume that each random coefficient is independent and identically distributed and
follows a Normal distribution with zero mean and unknown variance  σ u
2:  u N∼ (0 ,σu2 I J ), where  I J
denotes  the  J × J  identity  matrix. The  assumption  of  independence,  which  is  standard  within
multilevel  models,  will  be  relaxed  later  in  the  paper.  We  also  hypothesise  that  the  random
coefficients are uncorrelated with the estimate-level explanatory variables conditional on the study
means  (or  proportions)  of  the  explanatory  variables  themselves.  Modelling  such  dependence
explicitly guarantees the unbiased estimation of  β (Mundlak, 1978; Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh,
2004; Snijders and Bosker, 2012). Model fitting is carried out by maximum likelihood estimation.
Each coefficient in vector  β represents the change in the log-odds associated with a one-unit
change in the corresponding predictor,  conditional on the term  u j.  The direct influence of each
covariate on the probability of having a significantly positive treatment effect estimate can then be
computed as follows:
Pr ( yij=1|x ij ,u j )=
exp (β0+βx x ij+ u j )
1+exp (β0+βx x ij + u j )
If  one  is  interested  in  probability  predictions  that  are  free  of  the  term  of  unobserved  study
heterogeneity, these can be obtained by fixing u j at its expected value of zero.
3.4 Model specification
A key decision  relates  to  the  specification  of  the  meta-regression  model,  both  in  terms  of  the
covariates to be included and of the functional form that the linear predictor should take. 
Building  on  previous  literature,  we  select  the  following  explanatory  variables,  which  are
displayed in Table 2. First, to describe the type of programme, we define a dummy variable which
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takes value 1 for supports aimed at investments and value 0 for R&D or innovation supports; a
categorical variable describing the type of incentive provided to firms (direct loan; loan guarantee;
non-repayable subsidy; tax credit; support not specified by the authors or mixed); and a categorical
variable  for  the  level  of  government  implementing  the  programme.9 For  the  latter  variable,  in
addition to the categories ‘national’ and ‘regional’, we also define an ‘unknown’ category, as some
of the studies we analyse are based on survey data that do not report this information.
A second group of variables accounts for study characteristics. Here, a dummy indicates if a
study is published in refereed journals or book chapters rather than in working papers or research
reports; and a categorical variable describes the methodology adopted for estimation (parametric
DID;  RDD;  matched  DID;  matching;  other  parametric  methodologies).  Sample  size,  on  which
publication bias is often believed to depend (Begg and Berlin, 1988), is accounted for by a variable
reporting the square root of the observations constituting the largest sample in each study. The use
of the square root of sample size is advised by several scholars (e.g., Stanley, 2005; Card et al.,
2010) and our choice to consider the largest sample in each study is motivated by the idea that,
when studies report combinations of estimates based on both the available full sample and on some
subsamples of particular interest, publication selection is likely to depend more on the size of the
full sample rather than on that of its possible partitions. 
Third,  we define three variables  describing the outcome considered and the related type of
effect that is estimated in the studies. The first is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the outcome
variable is a quantity that is directly targeted by the incentive provided by the evaluated programme,
and 0 if it refers to an outcome that is more likely to be affected by the incentive in an indirect
fashion, only if something else occurs (or does not occur) in the meantime. An example can help
clarify this distinction. Let us consider a public loan guarantee. An estimate of the effect of the
programme on the reduction of the interest rate on aggregate debt refers to a quantity that is directly
targeted by the policy. On the contrary, an estimate related to firms’ turnover or productivity growth
refers to outputs that may be triggered by the innovation process itself, but which are not the direct
target of the programme. The second of such variables is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the
outcome  variable  is  measured  by  the  author  of  the  estimate  after  the  firm  participates  in  the
programme providing supports, rather than during its participation. This information is important,
as some outcome variables can be expected to change very soon after the receipt of a given support,
while others could take more time to change. For example, in the case of R&D subsidies, R&D
expenditures and firms’ propensity to co-operative research can change immediately after receipt of
the subsidy, while the effects of the policy (if any) on firms’ patenting activity or profitability can
reasonably be seen only after some time.10 The third and last of such variables is a categorical one
for the type of firms to which the estimate refers. Often, in addition to estimates referring to all
participant  firms,  studies  also  report  estimates  for  specific  subgroups  chosen  by  the  authors.
Depending on the type of programme and on the market failure it tries to address, we classified all
9 In the studies included in our analysis, programmes aimed at R&D may employ the following instruments: subsidies,
direct loans and tax-credit. Programmes aimed at investments may employ the following instruments: subsidies, direct
loans, tax-credit and public loan guarantees.
10 Out  of  431  estimates  on  outcomes  that  are  measured  simultaneously  to  programme participation,  39% refer  to
outcomes that are directly targeted by that particular type of programme, whereas 61% refer to outcomes that might be
affected  by the programme in a  more indirect  fashion.  Out of 635 estimates  on outcomes that  are measured after
programme participation, 124 (19.5%) refer to outcomes that are directly targeted by that particular type of programme,
whereas 80.5% refer to outcomes that might be affected by the programme in a more indirect fashion.
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estimates in four categories: all firms with no distinctions; estimates relative to the subgroup of
disadvantaged (or weaker) firms; estimates relative to the subgroup of advantaged firms; estimates
relative to other subgroups of firms. Disadvantaged firms are small firms, newborn firms, credit
constrained firms, firms with no R&D experience and the like, whose investing activity, according
to the literature, is likely to be hindered by certain obstacles (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1998; Beck and
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Peneder, 2008; Storey et al., 2016). On the contrary, advantaged firms are
larger firms, firms that do not have any credit constraints, firms with R&D experience, and so forth.
Sometimes, the estimates reported in the studies refer to other subgroups, such as firms that are
located  in  a  particular  geographical  area  or  firms  that  operate  in  a  particular  sector.  Since  the
definition of these subgroups does not respond to a general logic (as it is with the above mentioned
definition), but is rather the reflection of a specific interest of the author(s) in that particular study,
we group all these latter estimates in a residual category.
Finally, in order to control any possible systematic differences related to time, we include a
dummy variable which indicates if estimates are related to programmes implemented (or survey
data collected) before the recent economic crisis rather than during the crisis. 
In addition to the previous explanatory variables that may relate either to the estimates or to the
study the estimates come from, we use additional explanatory variables with the mean (proportion)
of  the  estimate-level  covariates  in  each  study  to  guarantee  independence  between  random
coefficients and estimate-level regressors. 
It makes sense to consider these additional descriptors of the study context provided there is
non-negligible variability of the underlying estimate-level covariates within the studies themselves.
Motivated by the statistics reported in Table 2, we added to the model the study-level proportions
of: the dummy for the timing of the effect; the dummy for the type of outcome variable; and the
categorical variable for the type of firms to which the estimate refers. 
For each discrete  variable  mentioned so far,  Table 3 reports  the proportion of significantly
positive treatment effect estimates and the average  t-statistic associated to all estimates that fall
under each level of these variables. These are just additional descriptive statistics in that such “vote
counts”  are  not  suitable,  per  se,  to  establish  which  programme,  estimate  or  programme
characteristics are associated with higher probability of success.
With respect to the functional form of the predictor, the main point is to assess whether it is
sufficient to insert covariates in the model in a merely additive fashion or if, instead, the inclusion
of some interaction terms between covariates ensures a better fit to the available data. Economic
reasoning may provide useful guidance in this process, by suggesting interactions that might make
sense in  our setting,  such as  those between the aim of  the programme,  the  incentive  type,  the
government level, the type of outcome variable, its timing and the kind of firms the estimate refers
to. From a statistical perspective, such an assessment requires to evaluate whether the coefficients
associated with interacted covariates are non-negligible and to check if the inclusion of interacted
covariates leads to significant gains in the likelihood of the model. After a careful evaluation of
interactions  in  the  data  at  hand,  we  found  that  none  of  these  fulfil  the  two  previous  criteria.
Therefore, we must conclude that the insertion of covariates in an additive fashion is appropriate.
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Table 2. Some descriptive statistics of the studies and estimates considered in the meta-regression
analysis
At the level of estimates
No. of studies in which
the variable is constant
across estimates
At the level of studies
Proportion/
Mean S.D.
Proportion/
Mean S.D.
Treatment effect is significantly (5%, left-
tailed) negative (1/0) 0.058 0.234 33/50 0.063 0.158
Treatment effect is significantly (5%, right-
tailed) positive (1/0) 0.322 0.467 13/50 0.526 0.327
Treatment effect is significantly (2.5%, 
right-tailed) positive (1/0) 0.254 0.436 13/50 0.467 0.342
t statistic (cont.) 1.117 3.394 5/50 1.795 2.352
Variables that are always constant within studies
Programme aimed at investments (1/0, base:
aimed at R&D) 0.471 0.499 50/50 0.520 0.505
Study was published (1/0, base: 
unpublished) 0.588 0.492 50/50 0.740 0.443
Sample size (No. of observations, cont.) 3,522 10,475 50/50 4,467 13,336
Variables that are usually constant within studies
Programme implemented before the recent 
crisis (1/0, base: during crisis) 0.568 0.496 46/50 0.696 0.448
Government level  
national 0.368 0.482 48/50 0.420 0.488
regional 0.577 0.494 49/50 0.430 0.495
unknown (survey data) 0.055 0.229 49/50 0.150 0.354
Incentive type  
direct loan 0.155 0.362 46/50 0.065 0.216
loan guarantee 0.053 0.223 50/50 0.100 0.303
subsidy 0.644 0.479 47/50 0.610 0.479
tax credit 0.044 0.205 49/50 0.083 0.274
unspecified or mixed 0.105 0.307 48/50 0.142 0.340
Methodology  
Difference in differences (parametric) 0.141 0.348 49/50 0.145 0.350
Regression discontinuity design 0.129 0.335 49/50 0.155 0.360
Matched difference in differences 0.299 0.458 49/50 0.261 0.442
Matching 0.303 0.460 47/50 0.282 0.442
Other  (parametric) 0.129 0.335 48/50 0.157 0.354
Variables that are seldom constant within studies
Directly targeted outcome (1/0, base: 
indirectly targeted outc.) 0.274 0.446 32/50 0.354 0.415
Non simultaneous effect (1/0, base: 
simultaneous) 0.596 0.491 41/50 0.460 0.462
Estimate refers to  
all firms (grand ATE or ATT) 0.498 0.500 30/50 0.704 0.358
disadvantaged firms 0.172 0.377 35/50 0.104 0.200
advantaged firms 0.114 0.319 39/50 0.048 0.103
other subgroup of firms 0.216 0.412 35/50 0.144 0.261
             
No. of observations 1,066     50
Notes. Group mean refers to the between-study mean of the within-study means. All variables, with the sole exception of n. of firms 
involved in estimation are binary variables. 
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Table 3. Proportions of significantly positive estimates and mean t-statistic for selected variables 
No. of
estimates
Proportion of positive
estimates for which t-statistic 
t ij > 1.645 t ij  > 1.96 Mean S.D.
Programme aimed at R&D 564 0.287 0.215 0.898 1.722
Programme aimed at investments 502 0.361 0.299 1.364 4.587
Study was published 627 0.311 0.260 1.172 4.160
Study appeared in other outlet 439 0.337 0.250 1.040 1.807
Programme implemented before the recent crisis 606 0.285 0.226 1.209 4.289
Programme implemented during the recent crisis 460 0.37 0.291 0.997 1.569
Government level
national 392 0.293 0.235 0.968 5.052
regional 615 0.307 0.233 1.058 1.616
unknown (survey data) 59 0.661 0.610 2.727 3.005
Incentive type
direct loan 165 0.430 0.333 1.449 1.352
loan guarantee 56 0.482 0.393 1.394 1.746
subsidy 686 0.251 0.187 0.747 1.772
tax credit 47 0.468 0.426 3.590 13.354
unspecified or mixed 112 0.455 0.411 1.723 3.006
Methodology
Difference in differences 150 0.253 0.207 0.934 2.664
Regression discontinuity design 137 0.328 0.263 0.746 2.053
Matched difference in differences 319 0.251 0.188 1.132 5.394
Matching 323 0.307 0.232 1.02 1.711
Other 137 0.591 0.504 1.888 1.571
Directly targeted outcome 292 0.425 0.336 1.855 5.647
Indirectly targeted outcome 774 0.283 0.224 0.839 1.893
Simultaneous effect 431 0.350 0.295 1.393 4.806
Non simultaneous effect 635 0.302 0.227 0.93 1.897
Estimate refers to
all firms (grand ATE or ATT) 531 0.303 0.247 1.235 4.44
disadvantaged firms 183 0.464 0.377 1.291 2.166
advantaged firms 122 0.23 0.156 0.892 1.418
other subgroup of firms 230 0.3 0.226 0.827 1.732
         
4. The network of co-authorship
So far,  we worked under  the  standard  assumption  that  the  study-level  random coefficients  are
independent from one another. However, if one looks at the list of authors of the studies involved in
our analysis (see Web Supplementary Material), it immediately emerges that the Italian literature
tends to gather around a limited number of relatively prolific names. These authors may evaluate
the  same  programme  in  multiple  studies,  although  at  different  points  in  time  or  emphasising
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different aspects. In total, the studies under investigation can be ascribed to 74 authors, with 22 of
them signing more than one study. In particular, 10 authors sign two, 7 sign three and 4 sign four
studies. One single author signs twelve studies.  Sometimes these prolific authors work with each
other, other times they work in connection with other authors that sign only that specific study.
Other times, there are isolated studies written by one-shot (co-)author(s).
Under  these  circumstances,  the  assumption  of  independence  between  study-level  random
coefficients, invoked in section 3.3, requires to be carefully assessed. To do so, we must envision
some plausible departure from it. The most straightforward departure is that articles sharing at least
one author may not be independent. Dependence might be due to an author’s mindset, competencies
and so forth that contribute to multiple studies, as well as to the fact that a same author may be
using  the  same  data  multiple  times.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  seems  sensible  to  consider
directed linkages from earlier studies toward later ones, and bi-directed links between studies that
were developed over the same time period (i.e., they appeared in the same calendar year or with a
maximum lag  of  one  year).  We can  visualise  the  resulting  situation  in  Figure  2, using  social
network analysis tools (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Scott and Carrington, 2011).
Figure 2. Co-authorship network of the studies under investigation, where earlier studies influence
later ones, and concomitant studies influence each other
Notes. Nodes, marked with black circles, are articles, identified by the numerical identifier reported in the reference list. Lines are the
co-authorship linkages that connect the nodes. Relationships are directed, or bi-directed. Network visualisation is performed using
Ucinet (Borgatti et al., 2002). 
The network structure can be described through a J × J asymmetric adjacency matrix W, whose
elements  whk (h,k=1 , … ,J) are  equal  to  1  if  study  h receives  influence  from  study  k, and  0
otherwise. 
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We can extend model [2] to allow for correlated random coefficients as follows. Let v be the
results  of  a  Simultaneously  Autoregressive  (SAR)  process  (Anselin,  1988):  v =ρ Wv + u,  with
unknown autocorrelation coefficient ρ that quantifies the strength of the between-study dependence
described in W (in row-standardised form) and, again, u N∼ (0 ,σu2 I J ). Then v can be expressed as
v = ( I J −ρ W )
−1u and model [2] becomes
η =Xβ+D ( I J − ρ W )
− 1u. [3]
The random coefficients now follow a Normal distribution v N∼ (0 , Σ ) where the covariance matrix
Σ is defined by two unknown parameters, ρ and σ u
2, that need to be estimated: 
Σ=σu
2 [ ( I J −ρ W ) ' ( I J −ρ W ) ]
−1
. [4]
From [4] it is easy to note that, if   ρ= 0, the assumption of independence between study-level
random coefficients holds. In such case, the appropriate model is the one introduced in Section III.
Instead, if ρ ≠ 0, the model accounting for between-study dependence is preferable.
5. Results
5.1 Appropriateness of our multilevel meta-regression model
Before discussing the main results of the analysis, we wish to highlight how the data support our
choice to account for unobserved study heterogeneity through a multilevel model. Moreover, we
wish to show that,  in spite of the co-authorship network examined in Section 4, the usage of a
model where study-level random coefficients are assumed to be independent from one another is
statistically reasonable with the data at hand.
In  order  to  establish  whether  unobserved  study  heterogeneity  actually  represents  a  non-
negligible issue, we estimate the variance parameter σ u
2 related to model [1]. Then we compare the
deviance of the multilevel  model  to the deviance of an ordinary logit  model  that  has the same
covariates and test the difference against a Chi-bar distribution (see Snijders and Bosker, 2012, pp.
98-99).  As  shown  in  Table  4  (columns  A  and  B),  the  test  supports  the  appropriateness  of  a
multilevel model. The Table also reports estimates of σ u, i.e. the standard deviation of the random
coefficients, which is anything but negligible in the models for both Pr (t ij>1 .645 ) (column A) and
Pr (t ij>1 .96 ) (column B).  In  fact,  the intraclass  correlation,  i.e.  the proportion of  total  variance
accounted for by the study-level random coefficients, is 25.8% in the former, and 26.9% in the
latter.
In addition, we follow up the reasoning outlined in Section 4 and assess whether the assumption
of independent study-level random coefficients is plausible in our context. Table 4, columns C and
D, reports estimates of σ u, ρ and β from a model where the vector of random terms is v =ρ Wv+ u.
The estimate of ρ, which is expected to quantify the strength of the between-study dependence, is
not statistically different from zero, whereas the estimate of the standard deviation of the residual
independent random components,  σ u, is significantly positive. Furthermore, the estimates of β are
quite similar across columns A and C, as well as across columns B and D. Therefore, the hypothesis
of independent study-level random coefficients seems plausible. 
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5.2 Probability of a positive effect for different types of programmes
Let us now comment on the estimated coefficients β and, in parallel, use such coefficients, provided
they are statistically significant, to predict probability differences across alternative levels of the
explanatory variables.  While  predicting  these values,  we neutralise  the influence of unobserved
study heterogeneity  by fixing each random effect  u j at  its  mean value of  zero.  This  allows to
generalise  the inference  to  all  Italian  programmes analogous to  those analysed here,  and to  go
beyond study-specific factors of success (or of failure). For the same reason, we set √n=0 and the
remaining covariates at their mean value. 
The coefficient is positive if the treatment effect estimate refers to an outcome that is directly
targeted  by  the  programme  rather  than  to  another  outcome  (Table  4).  For  instance,  an  R&D
programme is more likely to succeed in raising private R&D expenditure than productivity or sales.
This coefficient translates into a 30.1% higher probability of having a significant (at 5%) positive
estimate  (Table  5).  With  95% confidence,  such  higher  probability  ranges  between  18.1% and
42.1%, which leaves almost no doubts about the fact that the type of outcome chosen in the study
makes a difference. 
Moreover,  we  find  a  negative  coefficient  when  the  treatment  effect  estimate  refers  to  an
outcome  that  is  lagged  forward  in  time,  rather  than  measured  immediately  after  programme
participation, which translates into an interval prediction of the differential probability of having a
significant  (at  5%)  positive  estimate  between  -34.4% and  -6.4% (point  prediction  is  -20.4%).
Therefore,  timing  also  matters.  These  results  suggest  the  idea  that  enterprise  and  innovation
programmes can be more effective in supporting the initial stages of the investment process than in
ensuring that such process is completed with success, or in leading to other positive results later on. 
The estimated coefficients also suggest that programmes are better at supporting disadvantaged
firms,  rather  than  advantaged  ones.  In  fact,  whereas  both  the  positive  coefficient  we yield  for
disadvantaged firms, and the negative one we estimate for advantaged firms, are at times barely
significant relative to the baseline category (all firms), the direct contrasts between disadvantaged
and advantaged firms is  characterised by an extremely significant  coefficient  (p-value = 0.001)
equal to 1.11 in favour of the former. In fact, the differential probability of having a significant (at
5%) positive estimate is point predicted at 26%, with a confidence interval from 12.1% to 39.8%
(Table 5). This result generalises to a broad set of programmes supporting business investment the
finding achieved by Castellacci and Mee Lie (2015) in their MRA concerned with R&D tax credits
alone. If one believes that policies should alleviate some of the constraints on investments faced by
smaller and younger firms, rather than picking those who are already winners, then our finding
indicates that, in Italy, these policies are far from being useless. 
The coefficient associated with √n is close to zero and statistically non-significant. This result
suggests that the probability of having a significantly positive treatment effect estimate does not
increase with larger study sample size, as would be expected if there was publication bias. To this
regard, we may see that also the coefficient of the publication status is insignificant. Therefore,
publication bias does not seem to pose serious threats in our study. 
All the previous results are essentially confirmed by a random-intercept meta-regression model
that has identical covariates, but where the response variable is 1 if the treatment effect estimate is
significant at 2.5% (Table 4, Column B). Here, a significant positive coefficient is found if one
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shifts the programme goal from R&D to more indiscriminate investments, which translates into a
24.9% higher predicted probability of having a significant (at 2.5%) positive estimate (Table 5).  
Unfortunately,  the  empirical  evidence  reported  by  the  Italian  literature  at  hand  is  not  yet
sufficient to draw conclusions on whether a significant positive effect is more or less likely to be
met with national or regional programmes, or on whether one policy instrument works better than
another one. However, as shown in Table 6, the probability of finding a positive treatment effect
estimate may be rather high for the most common types of support schemes. The Table reports the
predicted probability of an immediate positive effect for all firms, on an outcome that is directly
targeted by the treatment and with respect to the most common of such schemes. For example, an
R&D subsidy is expected to produce a significantly (at 5%) positive effect 60.2% of times, with an
interval  prediction  ranging  from 35.8% to  84.6%.  An investment  loan,  instead,  is  expected  to
produce a significantly (at 5%) positive effect 86.4% of times; at worst, the effect is positive 70.6%
of times. 
Table 4. Estimated model coefficients
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Outcome: logit(Pr(tij>1.645) logit(Pr(tij >1.96) logit(Pr(tij >1.645) logit(Pr(tij>1.96)
Model: Random intercept Random intercept Random intercept Random intercept
Study-level random 
coefficients uij are: assumed independent from each other assumed not independent from each other
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
FIXED PART
Programme aimed at investments
(base: Aimed at R&D) 0.736 0.570 1.232** 0.615 0.747 0.754 1.198* 0.871
Directly targeted outcome (base: 
Indirectly targ. outc.) 1.249*** 0.265 0.896*** 0.299 1.230*** 0.29 0.884*** 0.315
Non simultaneous effect (base: 
Simultaneous) -0.850*** 0.301 -0.688** 0.343 -0.853*** 0.305 -0.702* 0.332
Disadvantaged firms (base: All 
firms) 0.446* 0.259 0.446 0.285 0.444* 0.282 0.453* 0.302
Advantaged firms (base: All 
firms) -0.663** 0.330 -0.738* 0.378 -0.664* 0.336 -0.737* 0.384
Other subgroup of firms (base: 
All firms) -0.489* 0.284 -0.595* 0.315 -0.486* 0.312 -0.589* 0.343
Loan guarantee (base: Direct 
loan) -0.527 1.183 -0.528 1.265 -0.430 1.735 -0.159 1.964
Subsidy (base: Direct loan) -0.697 0.532 -0.286 0.654 -0.864* 0.587 -0.400 0.747
Tax credit (base: Direct loan) 0.385 1.059 1.064 1.131 0.217 1.451 0.988 1.637
Unspecified or mixed instrument
(base: Direct loan) 0.987 0.824 1.577* 0.919 0.967 1.123 1.409 1.260
Regional programme (base: 
National programme) -0.062 0.583 -0.049 0.600 -0.603 0.787 -0.695 0.875
Unknown governance level 
(base: National programme) 2.327*** 0.857 2.475*** 0.887 2.661* 1.375 2.848* 1.501
√n  (centred) 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.006 -0.003 0.010 -0.002 0.012
RDD (base: DID) 0.168 0.937 0.196 0.972 0.158 1.255 0.348 1.453
Matched DID (base: DID) -0.334 0.853 -0.600 0.891 -0.452 1.249 -0.533 1.445
Matching (base: DID) -0.288 0.851 -0.404 0.886 -0.408 1.268 -0.452 1.455
Other methodology (base: DID) -0.029 0.972 -0.040 1.009 -0.576 1.413 -0.529 1.585
[cont]
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[cont]
Study was published (base: 
Unpublished) 0.019 0.674 0.168 0.709 0.042 0.863 0.110 0.978
Study-level proportion of 
estimates on directly affected 
outcomes -1.200 1.054 -1.070 1.096 -1.537 1.500 -1.451 1.689
Study-level proportion of 
estimates of non-simultaneous 
effects 1.430** 0.724 0.745 0.773 1.844* 0.980 1.156 1.082
Study-level proportion of 
estimates regarding 
disadvantaged firms 1.327 1.361 0.944 1.355 0.316 1.909 -0.204 2.098
Study-level proportion of 
estimates regarding advantaged 
firms -0.648 2.260 -0.872 2.384 -1.540 3.603 -2.236 4.268
Study-level proportion of 
estimates regarding other 
subgroups of firms -1.098 1.072 -1.625 1.131 -1.251 1.405 -1.975 1.577
Grand intercept -0.315 1.342 -0.475 1.425 0.963 1.943 0.848 2.181
RANDOM PART
σ u 1.144*** 0.245 1.211*** 0.247 1.661*** 0.421 1.886*** 0.504
ρ 0.081 0.377 0.253 0.370
LR test vs. marginal model 
(based on a Chi-bar distribution) 30.56*** 35.77*** - -
Observations 1,066   1,066   1,066     1,066  
AIC 1,151.5 1,006.1 - -
Log Likelihood -549.7 -477.1 - -
* p<0.10;  ** p<0.05;  *** p<0.01
Table 5. Predicted probability differences for alternative levels of selected explanatory variables
Probability difference 95% C.I.
Model for Pr(tij >1.645)
Programme aims at: Investment vs. R&D 0.175 -0.087 0.438
Type of outcome: Directly targeted outcome vs. Other outcome 0.301 0.181 0.421
Timing of effects: Non simultaneous vs. Simultaneous effect -0.204 -0.344 -0.064
Estimate refers to: Disadvantaged vs. Advantaged firm 0.260 0.121 0.398
Advantaged vs. All firms -0.149 -0.287 -0.011
Disadvantaged vs. All firms 0.111 -0.015 0.236
Model for Pr(tij >1.96)
Programme aims at: Investment vs. R&D 0.249 0.006 0.491
Type of outcome: Directly targeted outcome vs. Other outcome 0.194 0.057 0.330
Timing of effects: Non simultaneous vs. Simultaneous effect -0.142 -0.286 0.002
Estimate refers to: Disadvantaged vs. Advantaged firm 0.235 0.097 0.373
Advantaged vs. All firms -0.133 -0.258 -0.008
Disadvantaged vs. All firms 0.102 -0.028 0.233
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Table 6. Predicted probability of immediate positive effect for all firms on an outcome that is likely
to be directly affected by treatment with respect to six common programmes
Model for Pr(tij >1.645) Model for Pr(tij >1.96)
Probability 95% C.I. Probability 95% C.I.
R&D subsidy 0.602 0.358 0.846 0.351 0.096 0.605
R&D loan 0.752 0.506 0.998 0.418 0.046 0.790
R&D tax credit 0.817 0.536 1.000 0.676 0.249 1.000
Investment subsidy 0.759 0.573 0.945 0.649 0.399 0.900
Investment loan 0.864 0.706 1.000 0.711 0.404 1.000
Investment loan guarantee 0.789 0.438 1.000 0.593 0.062 1.000
Although it is impossible to say with sufficient certainty which programme works best, we must
acknowledge that these figures are high enough to stir some optimism on these programmes. They
basically rule out the idea that all these different programmes are a complete waste of money and
that  everything would be as  good without  them,  which  is  in  line  with the  conclusions  already
reached by Dimos and Pugh (2016) with respect to R&D subsidies alone.
6. Concluding remarks
In  this  paper,  we  perform a  multilevel  meta-regression  analysis  of  programme  evaluations  of
enterprise and innovation policies that were implemented in Italy. We find that a positive effect of
such policies is more likely to emerge when treatment effects are estimated on outcome variables
that are measured immediately after programme participation and on outcomes that are directly
targeted by the policies themselves. Indeed, depending on the type of programme, the probability of
occurrence of positive treatment effects is higher when the outcome variables refer, for example, to
R&D expenditures, amount of capital investment, receipt of favourable bank loans or lower interest
rates,  than  when  it  refers  to  other  indicators  of  firm  performance,  such  as  patenting  activity,
turnover, growth of productivity, profitability or, more in general, employees. Although positive
effects  on  the  latter  type  of  outcomes  are  often  highly  desired  by  policymakers,  they  are
unfortunately less likely to arise, perhaps as they require that a certain causal chain of events takes
place after the treatment, a causal chain whose completion the treatment itself may be unable to
guarantee. Evidently, these policies are likely to achieve in the short run some results for which they
were designed, but they are also unlikely to bring about more complex ones, or to promote change
over a longer time horizon. 
Another important result that we find is that weaker firms that suffer from tighter investment
constraints are most likely to benefit from positive effects, whereas support to stronger firms is
more likely to translate into a non-significant impact.
At any rate, the main conclusion of this meta-analysis is that the cliché that most enterprise and
innovation programmes are a complete waste of money has to be rejected. In fact, although the
available data do not allow yet to establish which type of programme works best, our findings show
that the probability of obtaining some positive effect is quite high for all types of schemes. Though
this result may stir some optimism, some caution is required, as a positive treatment effect estimate
is only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for these programmes being ultimately value for
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money. Moreover, optimism is justified to the extent that these policies are not required to respond
to purposes for which they were not designed. Indeed, while these policies can support various
forms of firms' investment, they may fail to achieve more complex development goals.   
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